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ABSTRACT
The aim of the study is a legal analysis of the provisions criminalizing hate speech in Polish 
criminal law, in terms of the protection of inherent human dignity in relation to people with disabil-
ities. Rated whether the absence of special protection under criminal law in the area of hate speech 
provides the proper respect and protects the dignity of persons with disabilities in Poland, to the 
same extent and degree as other people. The doctrine of criminal law protection against hate speech 
was discussed. It was analysed why hate speech against people with disabilities was not penalized 
and it was shown that legal changes in this area should be preceded by a multifaceted legal analysis, 
taking into account international standards, and proposals for amendments were characterized by 
an insufficient justification of the inalienable value of dignity. A discussion was held on the basis of 
criminalizing hate speech against people with disabilities. It has been shown that extending protection 
against hate speech to people with disabilities is not questionable and should be based on ensuring 
that dignity is adequately protected by the rule of law in order to counterbalance limitations resulting 
from the feature of disability, which is essentially independent of them.
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Every human being, even those afflicted with a disability of their body or psy-
che, has dignity and special value from the beginning of their existence until their 
natural death. The protection of persons with disabilities in Polish criminal law is 
a complex issue. Even a cursory examination of this problem suggests that it can be 
considered in various contexts and against the background of various regulations. 
It must be said that, like any human being, a person with a disability is subject to 
extensive protection by the norms of criminal law. Special care for people with 
disabilities in Poland should result from, among other things, Article 30 of the 
Polish Constitution1 of the principle of inherent and inalienable human dignity. 
The dignity of a human being constitutes his/her subjectivity and autonomy. Thus, 
public authorities have a special duty to protect human dignity. This protection is 
particularly important for people with disabilities, who find it difficult to sufficiently 
independently care for their subjectivity.
The obligation to protect people with disabilities also arises from the inter-
national obligations of the Republic of Poland, in particular, the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 13 December 2006.2 In this Convention, the international com-
munity affirmed the need to protect the dignity of such persons. It committed 
states to adopt effective legal measures to eliminate injustice, discrimination, 
and violations of the rights of persons with disabilities. The Convention makes 
frequent reference to the concept of dignity, not only in the Preamble but also in 
its essential content. Article 1 already refers to respect for the inherent dignity of 
persons with disabilities. It should be noted that in Europe, dignity is beginning 
to be interpreted in two ways – as a fundamental right in itself and as the real 
basis of fundamental rights.3
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Article 12 promotes 
the right of people with disabilities to be subjects before the law and therefore with 
legal capacity in all spheres of life. It is, therefore, necessary to support this group of 
people to prevent any abuse. The purpose of the Convention is to promote, protect, 
and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms by all persons.4 It explicitly states respect for the inherent dignity of persons 
1 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 
483, as amended). English translation of the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/
kon1.htm [access: 10.09.2021].
2 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on 13 December 2006 (Journal of Laws 2012, item 1169, as amended), hereinafter: Convention.
3 B. Mikołajczyk, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw osób straszych, Warszawa 2012, p. 108.
4 E. Bieńkowska, Wiktymologia, Warszawa 2018, p. 221.
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with disabilities, individual autonomy, including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices, and independence of persons.5
It should be recognized that any violation of human rights is a violation of dig-
nity. However, some categories of people, e.g., people with disabilities, because of 
their characteristics, are particularly vulnerable to actions which constitute the most 
severe violation of their dignity. Usually, these violations arouse fierce opposition 
from world public opinion, but often the community is left helpless against it. 
Hate speech against people with disabilities is a kind of crime that is an everyday 
experience for many of them, leaving significant psycho-emotional scars. At this 
point, it can be argued that people with disabilities do not have sufficient support 
in Poland to protect their dignity against hate speech. Provisions in criminal law 
do not seem to sufficiently protect this social group, due to the issue of the dignity 
of persons with disabilities as a basis for special protection. The reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the change in the catalogue of features subject to special protec-
tion against hate speech by including people with disabilities require analysis. The 
time frame of the last decade will be considered in this regard.
The aim of this article is a legal analysis of the provisions criminalizing hate 
speech in terms of the protection of inherent human dignity in relation to people 
with disabilities. This problem, despite the spreading of the idea of human rights, 
the development of society in the spirit of empathy and understanding of others, 
respect for their dignity, and the functioning of the law prohibiting discrimination, 
still often appears in society through negative attitudes connected with shame, lack 
of understanding, lack of basic feelings or ignorance of the essence of disability.
DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AS A BASIS FOR SPECIAL 
PROTECTION IN CRIMINAL LAW
Disability is about human beings, their sense of dignity, acceptance, and em-
pathy of society. People with disabilities are equipped with the ability to make 
informed choices,6 and respect for the dignity of each individual is a cornerstone 
of a pluralistic democratic society.
Dignity is understood as a special value of a human being as a person in in-
terpersonal relations, justifying and determining the sense of personal life, as well 
as positively valuing relations to one’s own person and the group with which one 
identifies oneself. The concept of dignity is complex, ambiguous and multivalent, 
5 R. Lang, The United Nations Convention on the right and dignities for persons with disability: 
A panacea for ending disability discrimination?, “Alter. European Journal of Disability Research” 
2009, vol. 3(3), p. 267.
6 Ibidem, p. 273.





it can be considered in various aspects, e.g. philosophical, psychological, religious 
or legal.7
Human dignity is inseparably connected with the whole system of civil liberties 
and rights, it is an essential component of the principle of a democratic state of law, 
and thus a binding legal norm. It determines the legal and positive status of an indi-
vidual in the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland, and at the same time it 
defines the essence of humanity in the fullest way.8 Personal dignity as an attribute 
acquired during life is not permanent, it is subject to various fluctuations, it may be 
completely destroyed, among other things, under the influence of external factors.9
Dignity is not relative, but absolute.10 Consequently, the absolute nature of the 
dignity of every human being precludes differentiation or gradation. It does not 
depend on social or material status, merit, education, physical or intellectual fitness, 
mental state, age, nationality, race, religion or language, or any other incidental 
human characteristics or social values, but on the very fact of belonging to the hu-
man race.11 Every human being as a human being has dignity. Man is born with his 
personal dignity, and any attempts to deprive man of his dignity do not diminish it.12 
The essence of the principle of human dignity is, first of all, to guarantee everyone 
a position that prevents him from being treated as an object of actions by others 
and an instrument in the realization of any goals. This law implies the prohibition 
of any objectification of a human being and the order to treat them subjectively.13
The absolute duty to treat all people subjectively is a moral imperative stem-
ming from the unconditional nature of human personal dignity. This means that 
personal dignity is independent of any human traits and characteristics including 
disability. Personal dignity is therefore bestowed upon persons affected by one or 
another type of disability.
7 More broadly, see N. Jacobson, Dignity and health: A review, “Social Science & Medicine” 
2007, vol. 64(2), pp. 292–302; M. Borski, Godność człowieka jako wartość uniwersalna, “Przegląd 
Prawa Publicznego” 2014, no. 3, pp. 7–20.
8 A. Deryng, Zasada poszanowania godności osoby ludzkiej w praktyce konstytucyjnej Rzecznika 
Praw Obywatelskich, [in:] Wpływ standardów międzynarodowych na rozwój demokracji i ochronę 
praw człowieka, ed. J. Jaskiernia, vol. 3, Warszawa 2013, p. 557; P. Polak, J. Trzciński, Konstytucyjna 
zasada godności człowieka w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, “Gdańskie Studia 
Prawnicze” 2018, no. 2, pp. 257–274.
9 A. Mikrut, O promowaniu godności człowieka w ramach Konwencji o prawach osób niepełno- 
sprawnych, “Rocznik Komisji Nauk Pedagogicznych” 2016, vol. 69, p. 109.
10 M. Granat, Godność człowieka z art. 30 Konstytucji RP jako wartość i jako norma prawna, 
“Państwo i Prawo” 2014, no. 8, pp. 3–22.
11 A. Deryng, op. cit., p. 546.
12 B. Szczupał, Godność osoby z niepełnosprawnością jako wyznacznik koncepcji praw czło-
wieka, “Człowiek–Niepełnosprawność–Społeczeństwo” 2012, no. 3, p. 30.
13 S. Zieliński, Rozumienie godności człowieka i jej znaczenie w procesie stanowienia i stosowa-
nia prawa. Propozycja testu zgodności regulacji prawnych z zasadą godności człowieka, “Przegląd 
Sejmowy” 2019, no. 4, p. 120.
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The role of human dignity in the area of human rights was analysed by R. An-
dorno,14 pointing to the existing relationships between these concepts and emphasiz-
ing the importance of dignity in this context. The appeal to dignity reflects genuine 
concern for respect for the intrinsic value of human rights and promotion of the 
preservation of identity.15 The meaning of human dignity is the theoretical axiom 
or moral value underlying the ideal of “Good” and collective duty in society. As 
such, human dignity can play an important role in research.16 It follows that dignity 
should play a more prominent role in the discussions and analysis in the field of 
normative legal issues relating to human rights.
Human rights express the objective conditions for the realization of such issues 
that constitute the value of human beings as a species. Presented as norms, they tell 
us how each person should treat and be treated by other people in order to have the 
opportunity to realize these potentialities.17 So what we call “human dignity” means 
awareness of the value of man. It is this value that makes each person worthy to be 
treated in such a way as to be able to live in harmony with himself. It can therefore 
be said that human dignity is a subjective correlate of his objective value.
The problem of the perception of dignity is also related to social and technical 
development, which is also reflected in research.18 In this regard, researchers point 
to the dangers of re-evaluating the social understanding of dignity especially in 
conjunction with technological implications. This, unfortunately, can have impli-
cations in misjudging legal norms.
Respect for the inherent dignity of people with disabilities, including the free-
dom to make their own choices, is based on the belief that such people have the 
ability to make informed choices for themselves.19 As disability is perceived dif-
ferently in different environments, disability is perceived in a complex and varied 
manner. This can lead to discriminatory behaviour. We currently live in a social 
paradigm designed with the human rights of people with disabilities in mind. 
This new model has been adopted in most countries of the world. This is in line 
with the so-called equality policy, i.a. as a result of joint actions in the field of 
law-making. However, regardless of these actions, there are cases of hate speech 
against people with disabilities that affect issues related to the escalation of social 
14 R. Andorno, Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics, 
“Journal of Medicine and Philosophy” 2009, vol. 34, pp. 223–240.
15 B.E. Gibson, B. Secker, D. Rolfe, F. Wagner, B. Parke, B. Mistry, Disability and dignity-en-
abling home environments, “Social Science and Medicine” 2012, vol. 74(2), pp. 211–219.
16 P. Gilabert, Human Dignity and Human Rights, Oxford 2019.
17 N. Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 292–302.
18 I. Kuçuradi, The concept of human dignity and its implications for human rights, “Bioethics 
Update” 2009, vol. 5, pp. 7–13.
19 R. Lang, op. cit., pp. 266–285.





exclusion.20 With regard to persons with disabilities are at greater risk of violation 
of their dignity as a result of the restrictions they have. These issues are the subject 
of complex analyses and studies that show the need for greater sensitivity towards 
this social group.21
Personal dignity is the source of human rights, but it is the state law that 
determines the real and not merely the ideological existence of this right. Thus, 
to ensure adequate rights for persons with disabilities in view of their personal 
dignity, adequate legal protection, including criminal law protection, is necessary. 
This is necessary to create specific living conditions, support structures, and legal 
protections that respond to the needs and developmental dynamics of a person with 
disabilities.22 Therefore, the starting point should be the necessity to guarantee that 
people with disabilities can enjoy all human and civil rights to the same extent and 
scope as any other person.23
Over the past decades, the United Nations has initiated a number of important 
legal regulations aimed at respecting and upholding the personal dignity of persons 
with disabilities. These initiatives act as a catalyst for national legislative, exec-
utive, and consultative bodies to take action in this field. The Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities is a good example of this. The obligations of the 
States that have ratified the Convention in this regard are expressed in a number of 
articles, as the Convention promotes a long list of rights and freedoms that should 
be enjoyed on an equal basis with others.
Man is a physical-spiritual whole, which is the basis of his inherent, inviolable 
and inalienable dignity, including that experienced by even the most profound dis-
turbances of development and functioning. Due to the so-called personal dignity, 
every human being deserves respect and fair treatment on the part of others. This 
means that the dignity of a person with a disability should be respected and pro-
tected to the same extent and to the same scope as for all other people.24 Therefore, 
rights based on that dignity, including the right to criminal law protection, should 
also be subject to specific protection going beyond the scope of persons without 
the listed additional social group characteristics.
20 J.A.G. Monedero, C.U. Cuesta, B.N. Angulo, Social Image of Disability. Vulnerability of the 
Dignity of Women with Disability and Social Exclusion Contexts, “Procedia – Social and Behavioral 
Sciences” 2014, vol. 161, pp. 115–120.
21 K. Zdravkova, Reconsidering Human Dignity in the New Era, “New Ideas in Psychology” 
2019, vol. 54, pp. 112–117.
22 A. Mikrut, O promowaniu godności…, p. 111.
23 B. Gąciarz, Model społeczny niepełnosprawności jako podstawa zmian w polityce społecznej, 
[in:] Polscy niepełnosprawni. Od kompleksowej diagnozy do nowego modelu polityki społecznej, eds. 
B. Gąciarz, S. Rudnicki, Kraków 2014, p. 34.
24 A. Mikrut, O poszanowaniu godności osób niepełnosprawnych – idea a rzeczywistość, “Pielę-
gniarstwo i Zdrowie Publiczne” 2013, no. 3–4, pp. 385–391; idem, O odkrywaniu swojej godności przez 
osoby z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną, “Annales UMCS. Sectio J” 2014, vol. 27(1), pp. 19–33.
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THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST  
HATE SPEECH
The issue of criminal law protection against hate speech is a subject of signif-
icant social interest and refers to the criminal liability of the so-called “haters”. 
The problem is first and foremost that increasing the degree of protection against 
behaviour based on prejudice against certain social groups and individuals within 
them is connected with the issue of freedom of expression.
It is well known that hate speech is considered statements that incite hatred as 
well as those that express hatred. Thus, the discredited entity may be a person or 
group of persons belonging to or constituting not only a particular minority, but also 
belonging to or constituting a particular majority. A characteristic of hate speech 
is that it involves prejudice due to certain discriminatory characteristics. Without 
motivation based on prejudice, there is no hate speech even if there is insult.
Hate speech can intimidate, threaten, humiliate, offend, as well as perpetuate 
stereotypes and lead to discrimination and even physical violence.25 The factor 
that causes a statement to be interpreted as hate speech is the nature of its content, 
which is evaluated objectively in the process of confronting it with the rules of 
social coexistence.26
Protection from hate speech is a contemporary aspect of the protection of human 
rights to dignity. It should be noted in this context that we are dealing with hate 
speech when the sole purpose of such speech is to express contempt or humiliation 
of a human being. The classification of hate speech and the proper response to this 
type of criminal behaviour can be problematic. Taking action against hate speech 
is sometimes considered an unjustified restriction on freedom of speech. In consid-
ering questions of the limits of free speech, one must consider the degree of harm 
in the speech in question. There are no clear criteria for determining the degree 
of such harm. Hence, the response to hate speech should not be too restrictive of 
freedom of speech, but must be adequate to the damage it causes or may cause.
The catalogue of goods protected by hate crime legislation should include those 
values that become frequent targets of attack in a given country. These are most 
often values inherent to the identity of members of certain social groups who are 
potential victims of this type of crime.
25 A. Śledzińska-Simon, Decyzja ramowa w sprawie zwalczania pewnych form i przejawów 
rasizmu i ksenofobii jako trudny kompromis wobec mowy nienawiści w Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Mowa 
nienawiści a wolność słowa. Aspekty prawne i społeczne, eds. R. Wieruszewski, M. Wyrzykowski, 
A. Bodnar, A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Warszawa 2010, p. 94; K. Machowicz, Jurydyczne uwarunko-
wania wolności wypowiedzi w Polsce jako kategoria praw człowieka w Polsce, Lublin 2012, p. 50.
26 L.K. Jaskuła, Wolność działalności dziennikarskiej w perspektywie zjawiska mowy nienawiści 
(wybrane aspekty prawne), [in:] Status prawny dziennikarza, ed. W. Lis, Warszawa 2014, p. 319.





In Recommendation no. R (97) 20 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe on 30 October 1997,27 “hate speech” is considered any form 
of expression that disseminates, incites, promotes or justifies racial hatred, xeno-
phobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including 
intolerance expressed in violent nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination 
and hostility towards minorities, immigrants and people of immigrant origin. Such 
an understanding of hate speech was referred to, i.a., by the Supreme Court in its 
judgement of 8 February 2019.28
The pejorative features of hate speech depend on the perception of the victim. 
For some, it may or may not affect. It can be shown that the effect of hate speech 
depends on the originator, content and the targeted one.29 Hate speech is intended to 
injure, dehumanize, harass, intimidate, debase, degrade, and victimize the targeted 
groups, and to foment insensitivity and brutality against them.30
Although in the Polish legal language there is no term “hate speech”, it is already 
a permanent element of the legal language – jurisprudence and legal doctrine. The 
literature emphasizes that “the hierarchy of protection for victims of hate speech 
is being created in the current state of law”.31
From the point of view of hate speech, mainly two provisions are relevant in 
criminal law – Articles 256 and 257 of the Polish Penal Code.32 In accordance with 
the provision of Article 256 PC whoever publicly propagates a fascist or other to-
talitarian system of the state or incites to hatred on the grounds of national, ethnic, 
racial, religious differences or on the grounds of irreligiousness shall be subject 
to group of people or public insult or violation of bodily integrity of a person be-
cause of his/her national, ethnic, racial, religious affiliation or because of his/her 
irreligiousness.
The norms contained in these provisions create certain doubts or disputes of 
practical nature. Judicial jurisprudence and legal doctrine highlight the difficulties 
of interpreting the phrase “incitement to hatred”, i.e., in the conduct of a person, 
who publicly presents the negative characteristics of the persons referred to in 
Articles 256 and 257 PC, there is no aspiration to cause negative emotions in other 
27 Recommendation no. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on “hate 
speech”, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 October 1997.
28 IV KK 38/18, LEX no. 2621830.
29 N. Chetty, S. Alathur, Hate speech review in the context of online social networks, “Aggression 
and Violent Behavior” 2018, vol. 40, pp. 108–118.
30 R. Cohen-Almagor, Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet, “Policy & Internet” 2011, 
vol. 3(3), pp. 89–114.
31 E. Rogalska, M. Urbańczyk, Złożoność zjawiska mowy nienawiści w pozaprawnym aspekcie 
definicyjnym, “Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 2017, vol. 39(2), p. 117.
32 Act of 6 June 1997 – Penal Code (consolidated text, Journal of Laws 2020, item 1444, as 
amended), hereinafter: PC.
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people, then such a person cannot be attributed with the realization of the elements 
of this crime.33 The Supreme Court in the decision of 5 February 200734 interpreting 
the phrase “incites to hatred”, explained that “incitement to hatred on the grounds 
listed in Article 256 PC […] boils down to such statements that arouse feelings 
of strong dislike, anger, lack of acceptance, even hostility towards individuals or 
entire social or religious groups or, because of the form of expression, maintain and 
intensify such negative attitudes and thus emphasize the privilege or superiority 
of a particular nation, ethnic group, race or religion”. The key is the impact of the 
perpetrator on the psyche of others, involving the intention to arouse in them “the 
strongest negative emotion, similar to hostility” to a particular person or social 
group.35 The Constitutional Tribunal in its judgement of 25 February 201436 ruled 
that the courts should take into account, when interpreting Article 256 § 1 PC, 
the principle of freedom of expression, which is a right guaranteed by the Polish 
Constitution and consistent with international and local standards. The Tribunal 
stressed that although the criminalization of incitement to hatred based on national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious differences undoubtedly restricts the freedom of ex-
pression, this restriction is consistent with the Polish Constitution and is necessary 
in a democratic society to ensure public order, as well as to protect the rights of 
other citizens.
It is obvious that the confrontation of hate speech with freedom of speech causes 
controversy in terms of drawing the line between what is offensive and should be 
banned and what is permissible under freedom of expression.37 It is beyond dispute, 
however, that incitement to hatred on the basis of certain differences is not just 
the expression of controversial views, which should of course be guaranteed, but 
a clear abuse of freedom of speech, aimed directly at causing or fuelling conflict.38
Human rights doctrine, to protect specific and socially important values and to 
unify the position within the international community, tries to develop standards 
to understand the concept of hate speech.39 This approach provides a basis for the 
33 A. Demczuk, Wolność wypowiedzi w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
a polskim prawie i praktyce sądowej, [in:] Europejska konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka – prak-
tyka stosowania i funkcjonowanie w przestrzeni europejskiej, eds. M. Haczkowska, F. Tereszkiewicz, 
Opole 2016, p. 151.
34 IV KK 406/06, OSNwSK 2007, no. 1, item 367.
35 D. Gruszecka, Przestępstwa przeciwko porządkowi publicznemu, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część 
szczególna. Komentarz, ed. J. Giezek, Warszawa 2014, p. 917.
36 SK 65/12, OTK 2014, no. 2, item 14.
37 A. Śledzińska-Simon, op. cit., p. 99
38 W. Mojski, Prawnokarne ograniczenia wolności wypowiedzi w polskim porządku prawnym: 
analiza wybranych przepisów, “Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2009, vol. 12, pp. 193–194.
39 A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Międzynarodowe standardy wolności słowa a mowa nienawiści, 
[in:] Mowa nienawiści w Internecie. Jak z nią walczyć? Materiały z konferencji, eds. D. Bychawska-
-Siniarska, D. Głowacka, Warszawa 2013, p. 45.





implementation and evolution of national law within a given scope, taking into 
account legal specificities and the body of case law. The analysis carried out within 
the framework of this study is in line with this, which on the one hand goes out of 
the box by referring to the issue of hate speech towards people with disabilities, 
while at the same time referring to international standards. Comprehensive approach 
to the indicated problems taking into account multifaceted legal research provides 
a basis for formulating de lege ferenda conclusions.
ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR NOT INTRODUCING 
THE PENALIZATION OF HATE SPEECH AGAINST PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES
Hate speech is a particular form of human rights violation.40 The question arises 
whether there is a need to criminalize the behaviour of inciting hatred on the basis 
of disability. In the past several years, there have been a number of proposals to 
amend the criminal provisions typifying hate speech crimes. The source of these 
proposals should be sought in the transformation of attitudes towards certain char-
acteristics of certain social groups and the individuals belonging to them. Table 1 
summarizes those proposed changes to the legislation that expand the catalogue of 
characteristics covered by hate speech protection and include people with disabili-
ties. Selected opinions of the National Council of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court, 
the Supreme Bar Council, the Prosecutor General and the Polish government were 
presented. It should be noted that all presented attempts to amend discrimination 
legislation have failed. The analysis in this respect will allow determining the 
reasons for not introducing the penalisation of hate speech to people with disabil-
ities. The problem is more complex because some victims, including people with 
disabilities, are particularly vulnerable during criminal proceedings to secondary 
and repeat victimisation, intimidation, and retaliation by the offender. This risk 
may be related to the personal characteristics of the victim, the type or nature, and 
the circumstances of the crime.
40 Metodyka pracy adwokata i radcy prawnego w sprawach o przestępstwa z nienawiści, ed. 
P. Knut, Warszawa 2020, p. 338.
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The first proposal to amend the legislation in the period under analysis was 
a parliamentary bill in the Sejm of the 6th term (Print no. 4253). It proposes to 
expand the catalogue of characteristics subject to special protection against hate 
speech to include gender, gender identity, age, sexual orientation and disability, 
which is the subject of this discussion. Despite the positive opinions of both the 
National Council of the Judiciary and the General Prosecutor, the proposal was not 
adopted. It was not rejected at first reading, but its status remained at the “case not 
closed” status. The Supreme Bar Council pointed out that the proposal narrows the 
scope of criminalisation in relation to the current wording into an effectual type. 
At the same time, reservations regarding the sufficient statutory specificity of the 
“disability” criterion were also indicated. One should agree with this opinion in 
terms of the significance of precision, because the provision refers to the sphere 
of freedom of speech as a constitutional value, defining its impassable limits. The 
next three deputies’ proposals were submitted in the Sejm of the 7th term, taking 
into account the same scope of extending the catalogue of characteristics subject to 
special protection. In principle, it can be assessed that they were a reference to the 
activities undertaken under the above-mentioned project of the Sejm of the 6th term.
These proposals were not recognized by the Polish government’s position. It 
was also indicated that the extension of the catalogue of criteria for groups subject 
to special protection to include “gender, gender identity, disability, age and sexual 
orientation” raises concerns as to the precision of individual concepts and the 
completeness of the criteria. Despite the fact that the projects include case studies 
and confirmation of the legitimacy of introducing regulations with appropriate 
statistics, one cannot resist the impression of certain chaos and duplication of 
previous patterns. There is no specific concept of justifying the amendments with 
structured arguments and discussion.
The above-mentioned errors in the justification are not included in the parlia-
mentary proposal of the Sejm of the 8th term (Print no. 878). The authors clearly 
defined the purpose of the amendment and the good protected by law, and the 
entire justification was clearly referenced in the literature and statistical analyses. 
However, there is a noticeable lack of reference to the constitutional protection of 
human dignity. However, the proposed changes are not limited only to expanding 
the catalogue of protected premises – changes have also been introduced to clarify 
the current regulations in order to ensure uniform interpretation.
The current wording of these provisions allows for an interpretation that nar-
rows the criminal law protection to persons who actually are the bearers of a given 
feature. Using such an interpretation, victims are excluded from protection, e.g. 
of violence, who although they do not have a specific feature themselves, but 
their victimization results from being associated with a person who has a specific 
feature, or from the fact that they are perceived by the environment as people with 
a specific feature. However, it can be argued that even better justification would 





not be appreciated by the legislator, as the proposal rejection in the first reading 
was only supported by the laconic opinion of the National Council of the Judiciary.
The legitimacy of a possible extension of protection against hate speech against 
persons of varying degrees of ability was indicated by the National Council of the 
Judiciary in its opinion on the proposal in the Sejm of the 9th term (Print no. 138). 
In the case of this draft, all opinions were negative, It is worth noting that the 
Supreme Court rationally justified the need to analyse the discriminatory criteria 
covered by the criminalization. He pointed to the need for the notion of directional 
decisions as well as system and analytical work, which must be coordinated with 
relevant scientific research.
The last proposal from the analysed period, in principle, does not justify in detail 
the need to extend the catalogue of features subject to special protection against 
hate speech, and it did not meet with the favour of the Supreme Court, the Nation-
al Council of the Judiciary and the Polish government. However, it is possible to 
point out the rather peculiar reasoning of the Supreme Court, in which the lack of 
legitimacy of the changes in the characteristics subject to special protection was 
stated that “it is about a completely different category of people”, without providing 
rational arguments for its opinion.
By analysing the amendment proposal to Article 256 PC, it can be pointed out that, 
first of all, there is a similarity in the proposed to add a catalogue of features subject 
to special protection against hate speech, which includes, in addition to disability, 
gender, gender identity, age and sexual orientation. In fact, only the last two drafts 
additionally included gender expression. However, it is characteristic that disability 
always occurs in a package with other characteristics with significant polarization 
in socio-political evaluation such as gender identity, sexual orientation, or gender 
expression. Without assessing at this point the legitimacy of the introduction of other 
factors of discrimination by way of hate speech, it could be concluded that the inef-
fectiveness of the extension of the scope of criminalization of Article 256 PC about 
people with disabilities can result from considering it together with other character-
istics. This thesis is confirmed by the negative assessment of the National Council of 
the Judiciary for the proposal of 12 December 2019, in which there is a reservation 
about the need to extend protection to people with different degrees of disability.
Among the main non-political problems with the failure to make changes for 
people with disabilities are issues related to the sufficiency of the statutory defi-
nition of the criterion of “disability” and the failure to adequately argue for the 
inclusion of additional criteria for protection against discrimination. It should be 
noted that the opinion of the Supreme Court, which is not unfounded, speaks of 
the need for systemic and analytical work and scientific research that must precede 
such proposals.
It is clear that effective identification of the presence of risks arising from a par-
ticular characteristic of a victim is only possible on the basis of an individual assess-
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ment, carried out at the earliest possible stage. Such an assessment should be carried 
out for all victims to determine what specific protection measures they need.41 The 
individual assessment should take into account the personal characteristics of the 
victim, including disability and the nature and circumstances of the crime.42
DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS FOR PENALIZING HATE SPEECH 
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
There is no agreement in the science of criminal law regarding the need for 
enhanced protection of persons with disabilities against hate speech. Scepticism is 
expressed about the role of criminal law in combating hate speech, with a simulta-
neous indication of the need to take action in this area on the basis of family, civil 
and administrative law.43 In turn, other authors draw attention to the disproportion 
in the level of intensity of protection of persons and groups distinguished on the 
basis of race, nationality, ethnic origin, religion or irreligiousness, and persons dis-
criminated on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age or disability. 
In the first case, qualified types of offences, higher criminal penalties, and a public 
prosecution procedure apply. In the second, there are basic types of crimes, lower 
criminal threats, and often a private prosecution mode. Moreover, the classification 
of an act motivated by hatred only under Articles 156, 157, 158, 190 or 217 PC 
does not reflect the criminal content of the act. In the light of the applicable legal 
regulation, persons belonging to the second group are therefore outside the scope 
of protection of the provisions of Articles 119, 256 and 257 PC. E. Zielińska be-
lieves that the need to extend the scope of criminalization by adding the features 
discussed to the catalogue is justified.44
The need to change the laws on hate speech towards people with disabilities has 
been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Polish Ombudsman. The function 
of the national human rights institution and independent monitoring body referred 
to in Article 33 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.45 
41 Article 55 of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims 
of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ EU L 315/57, 14.11.2012).
42 Articles 22 and 56 of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
43 M. Płatek, Mowa nienawiści – przesłanki depenalizacji, [in:] Mowa nienawiści a wolność 
wypowiedzi. Aspekty prawne i społeczne, eds. R. Wieruszewski, M. Wyrzykowski, A. Bodnar, A. Glisz-
czyńska-Grabias, Warszawa 2010, p. 911.
44 E. Zielińska, Opinia w sprawie projektu zmian kodeksu karnego, [in:] Raport o homofobicznej 
mowie nienawiści w Polsce, Warszawa 2008, pp. 78–80.
45 Informacja Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich o działaniach podjętych przez Rzeczpospolitą 
Polską w celu implementacji postanowień Konwencji o prawach osób niepełnosprawnych w la-
tach 2015–2017, 31.01.2018, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Informacja%20RPO%20





In the Information to the UN Committee on the Implementation of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Polish Ombudsman made a negative 
assessment of the fact that the provisions of the Penal Code do not take into account 
a specific type of crime motivated by prejudice against persons with disabilities. 
In the Polish Ombudsman’s view, hate speech against people with disabilities is 
not a crime at all and can only be prosecuted as an offence of insult prosecuted 
by private prosecution, which means that the burden of gathering evidence and 
bringing an accusation to court lies with the victim of the crime. In the opinion of 
the Polish Ombudsman, it is necessary to take a legislative initiative to extend the 
discriminatory grounds on the basis of disability.46
It is worth mentioning that on 16 February 2021 the Strategy for Persons with 
Disabilities for 2021–2030 was adopted.47 The Strategy clearly emphasizes that 
Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities obliges the 
State to take immediate, effective and appropriate measures to raise public aware-
ness. The effect is to combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices towards 
people with disabilities, including those related to gender and age, in all areas of 
life, and to promote awareness of the abilities and contributions of people with 
disabilities to society. This confirms not only the need for action to build public 
awareness of disability, including respect for the dignity and integrity of persons 
with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, and the right to live independently, 
but also for legal protection.
The Polish Ombudsman, in his comments to the proposals for the National 
Equal Treatment Action Programme for 2020–2030,48 stressed that building aware-
ness is undoubtedly important for the elimination of hate crimes, but it cannot 
replace the necessary legal changes. Here, one has to agree with the statement that 




46 See Pismo Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich do Ministra Sprawiedliwości, 14.05.2020, 
XI.503.3.2020.MA, www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Do%20MS%20ws%20sytuacji%20LGB-
TI%2C%2014.05.2020.pdf [access:10.02.2020]; Pismo Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich do Prezesa 
Rady Ministrów z rekomendacjami, 19.02.2019, XI.518.50.2017.MS, www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/
files/Wyst%C4%85pienie%20do%20Prezesa%20Rady%20Ministr%C3%B3w%20z%20rekomenda-
cjami%20ws.%20walki%20z%20mow%C4%85%20nienawi%C5%9Bci.pdf [access:10.02.2020]; 
Raport „Przestępstwa motywowane uprzedzeniami. Analiza i zalecenia”, 22.12.2017, www.rpo.gov.pl/
pl/content/raport-przestepstwa-motywowane-uprzedzeniami-analiza-i-zalecenia [access:10.02.2020].
47 Resolution no. 27 of the Council of Ministers of 16 February 2021 (Polish Monitor 2021, 
item 218).
48 Uwagi RPO do Krajowego Programu Działań Równego Traktowania na lata 2020–2030 
z dnia 1 grudnia 2020 r., 3.12.2020, www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-o-projekcie-programu-dzialan
-na-rzecz-rownego-traktowania-2021-2030 [access: 11.02.2021].
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as well as incitement to hatred on the basis of that characteristic, must be prohibited 
and prosecuted ex officio as specific acts punishable by a higher penalty. Such legal 
changes are necessary to make the fight against hate crime more effective so that 
people with disabilities who experience discrimination are protected.
Undoubtedly, the issue of criminalization of hate speech is one of the most 
controversial and most difficult to regulate areas of the issue of punishment for 
words. Due to the inability of hate speech to be covered by an unambiguous legal 
definition or a closed list of content that would be qualified as hateful, it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine through legal instruments the boundaries between 
permissible and prohibited speech.49 The case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights recognises, in principle, that it may be necessary for a democratic State 
to criminalise in national law content which promotes, incites or justifies hatred 
based on intolerance, provided that any measures taken by the State are necessary 
and proportionate to the aim pursue.50 The Constitutional Tribunal in its decision 
clearly indicates that the Convention values and the foundations of a democratic 
society are tolerance and social peace, and “hate speech” is understood in a broad 
way, as speech advocating intolerance and discrimination against other people or 
social groups. This approach is broader than the dispositions of Polish criminal 
law, which are limited in this regard only to religious and nationality reasons. It is 
therefore right to include in the protection against hate speech people with disa-
bilities, who find it more difficult to sufficiently care for their subjectivity, which 
is intrinsically linked to dignity.
It is difficult to agree with the objections that the criterion of “disability” is not 
sufficiently defined by statute. Introducing additional criteria such as the depend-
ence of the protection of the person on the degree of disability can only increase 
the legislative chaos. Disability is a characteristic over which we generally have 
little control, it may be congenital or acquired, but it can never affect the protection 
of dignity. Therefore, maintaining proportionality between the appropriate level 
of protection of dignity and the limitations resulting from the feature of disability 
should be compensated for by including persons with disabilities in the catalogue 
of features subject to special protection against hate speech. Article 256 PC should 
read: “Whoever publicly promotes a fascist or other totalitarian system of the state 
or incites hatred on the basis of national, ethnic, racial or religious differences or due 
to irreligiousness or disability, shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of restriction 
of liberty or imprisonment for up to 2 years”. In this context, the introduction of 
criminal law protection of people with disabilities against hate speech is justified. 
It is, in fact, only compensation for the reduced ability to protect dignity due to 
a feature essentially independent of them.
49 A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, op. cit., p. 45.
50 Judgement of the ECtHR of 16 June 2009 in case Feret v. Belgium, application no. 15615/07.






Human dignity is a fundamental inherent value that should be respected and 
protected equally in all people. Therefore, steps towards changes in legal protec-
tion should be guided by this principle in order to balance the interactions. Legal 
protection against hate speech requires an appropriate degree of protection and 
should serve to counteract discriminatory behaviour towards certain individuals 
or social groups.
It seems that legal changes in the field of penalizing hate speech relating to spe-
cific features, in this case disability, should be considered individually and preceded 
by a multifaceted legal analysis, taking into account international standards. Such 
an approach may reduce the risk of group rejection of all additional features due 
to worldview aspects. In this context, among the reasons for not introducing the 
criminalization of hate speech against people with disabilities, one can point to 
the fact of its combined introduction with other features that build controversy 
in the socio-political assessment. After analysing the opinions on the proposals 
amendments, it can be concluded that the legislator would be more willing to ac-
cept provisions limited only to the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
disability. The separation of such a prohibition from other prohibitions of discrimi-
nation will of course not be effective without a whole system of legal and practical 
measures aimed at creating conditions for the realization of the rights of persons 
with disabilities, but it would certainly be the first step to clearly emphasize them.
The common element of all the justifications in terms of an amendment to 
extend the catalogue features subject to special protection from hate speech is the 
fact that proposals were characterized by insufficient justification for the issue of 
inalienable worth and dignity. The normative decision to intensify criminal re-
pression of behaviour motivated by new discriminatory circumstances should be 
preceded by an appropriate analysis of the phenomenon. The project proponent must 
demonstrate that certain legal assets require enhanced protection, and in particular 
that existing legal instruments do not provide such protection or provide it at an 
insufficient level. Effective legal protection based on the individual feature of the 
victim requires a systemic approach taking into account the body of literature and 
international standards. In conclusion, it can be stated that the coverage of persons 
with disabilities against hate speech is not in doubt and should be based on ensuring 
adequate protection of dignity by the rule of law due to the balance of limitations 
resulting from a feature of disability that is essentially independent of them.
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ABSTRAKT
Celem pracy jest analiza prawna przepisów kryminalizujących mowę nienawiści w polskim 
prawie karnym w zakresie ochrony przyrodzonej godności człowieka w odniesieniu do osób z nie-
pełnosprawnościami. Oceniono, czy brak szczególnej ochrony prawnokarnej w obszarze mowy 
nienawiści zapewnia należyty szacunek i ochronę godności osób z niepełnosprawnościami w Polsce 
w takim samym zakresie i stopniu jak innych osób. Omówiono doktrynę ochrony prawnokarnej 
przed mową nienawiści. Przeanalizowano przyczyny niewprowadzenia penalizacji mowy nienawiści 
wobec osób z niepełnosprawnościami i wykazano, że zmiany prawne w tym zakresie powinny być 
poprzedzone wieloaspektową analizą prawną z uwzględnieniem standardów międzynarodowych, 
a projekty nowelizacji cechowały się niewystarczającym uzasadnieniem kwestii niezbywalnej war-
tości godności. Przeprowadzono dyskusję w zakresie podstaw penalizacji mowy nienawiści wobec 
osób z niepełnosprawnościami. Wykazano, że objęcie osób z niepełnosprawnościami ochroną przed 
mową nienawiści nie budzi wątpliwości i powinno opierać się na zapewnieniu odpowiedniej ochrony 
godności przez państwo prawa ze względu na zrównoważenie ograniczeń wynikających z cechy 
niepełnosprawności, która jest zasadniczo od nich niezależna.
Słowa kluczowe: ochrona prawnokarna; osoby z niepełnosprawnościami; godność człowieka; 
mowa nienawiści
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 27/10/2021 17:05:52
UM
CS
Po
we
re
d 
by
 T
CP
DF
 (w
ww
.tc
pd
f.o
rg
)
